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Abstract In this paper, I argue for the existence of two distinct kinds of 
protagonists’ perspective taking in narrative texts. The first, Free Indirect 
Discourse, represents conscious thoughts or utterances of protagonists and 
involves context shifting: All context-sensitive expressions with the exception of 
pronouns and tenses are interpreted with respect to the fictional context of some 
salient protagonist (Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015). 
The second, which I dub viewpoint shifting, does not necessarily represent 
conscious thoughts or utterances and it does not involve context shifting. Rather, 
a situation is described as it is perceived by a salient protagonist or in a way that 
reflects the doxastic state of such a protagonist, not with respect to the Common 
Ground (CG) of narrator and reader. While FID is only available at the root level, 
i.e. at the speech act level, viewpoint shifting is available at the level of finite 
matrix clauses.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In narrative texts sentences that are neither direct quotations nor embedded under 
a propositional attitude verb such as say or think can nevertheless often be 
understood as expressing the utterances or thoughts of a protagonist. This 
particular form of speech or thought representation, which is formally clearly 
distinguishable from both direct discourse (henceforth: DD) and indirect 
discourse (henceforth: ID), has long been known to literary scholars by the name 
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free indirect discourse (henceforth: FID) (see Hamburger 1968 and Stanzel 1979 
and the references therein), and	has	also	been	discussed	by	many	 linguists	 in	descriptive	terms	(Harweg 1972; Plank 1986; von Roncador 1988; see Dirscherl 
and Pafel 2015 for a recent overview). More recently, FID has become a research 
topic for linguists working in the tradition of truth conditional semantics, and, 
building on ideas first formulated by Banfield (1982) and Doron (1991), various 
analyses have been proposed to capture the distinctive properties of FID in a 
formally precise way (Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014; Maier 2015).1 
The most striking of these properties is that in FID all deictic expressions with the 
exception of pronouns and tenses are interpreted with respect to a fictional context 
(in the sense of Kaplan 1979) that has been set up by the preceding linguistic 
context. That fictional context consists of the protagonist whose thoughts or 
utterances are represented, the spatiotemporal location of that protagonist at the 
respective utterance or thinking time and the world containing that spatiotemporal 
location. Pronouns and tenses, in contrast, cannot be interpreted this way since 
both the respective protagonist and her (in case of speech representation) 
addressee can only be referred to by third person pronouns, not by first and 
second person ones, and verbal tense marking always contains a layer of past, not 
present. This mixed behavior of deictic elements has lead Schlenker (2004), 
Sharvit (2008) and Eckardt (2014) (whose analyses otherwise differ in many 
important respects) to postulate that sentences in FID mode are interpreted with 
respect to two different contexts: the narrator’s context, which is only relevant for 
the interpretation of pronouns and tenses, and the fictional context of the 
respective protagonist, which is relevant with respect to all other context-sensitive 
expressions. Maier (2015), in contrast, analyzes FID as a special, highly 
conventionalized form of mixed quotation: The reader has to accommodate a 
prominent protagonist’s speech or thought act to be partially quoted, with 
pronouns and tenses being unquoted.  
In this paper I argue that there is a second kind of protagonists’ perspective 
taking, which I dub viewpoint shifting (henceforth: VS) and which is likewise not 
marked as such via the presence of propositional attitude verbs, but which differs 
from FID in three important respects. First, it does not involve partial context 
shifting, i.e. all context sensitive expressions are interpreted with respect to the 
narrator’s context. Second, what is rendered in VS is not necessarily the content 
of a conscious thought or utterance. Rather, a situation is described as it is 
perceived by a salient protagonist or in a way that reflects the doxastic state of 
such a protagonist at the relevant time, not with respect to the Common Ground 
(CG) of narrator and reader. Finally, while FID is only available at the level of 
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entire sentences corresponding to speech or thought acts, VS is available at the 
level of finite matrix clauses that are contained in complex sentences. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the relevant characteristics of 
FID and VS are introduced and discussed. In Section 3 I present my analysis of 
VS in the first subsection. In the second subsection I discuss the question of 
which of the existing analyses of FID is best suited to account for the restrictions 
observed in Section 2. Section 4 discusses some directions for future research. 
 
2 The formal characteristics of FID and VS 
 
2.1 Free Indirect Discourse 
 
Consider the three sentences in (1a-c): 
 
(1) a. On her way home, Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked 
on the radio. She would buy his new album tomorrow. 
b. On her way home, Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked 
on the radio. She thought that she would buy his new album on the 
following day. 
c. On her way home, Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked 
on the radio. She thought: “I will buy his new album tomorrow”. 
 
The final sentence in (1a) exemplifies the characteristics of FID mentioned in the 
introduction: On the one hand, the deictic temporal adverb tomorrow is 
interpreted with respect to the fictional context provided by the immediately 
preceding sentence, i.e. as referring to the day following the day where the event 
introduced by the opening sentence took place. On the other hand, the layer of 
past tense marking on the modal auxiliary (giving rise to a future in the past 
interpretation2) in combination with the fact that a third person pronoun is used to 
refer to Mary clearly indicates that no complete shift to Mary’s fictional context 
has occurred. If that were the case, the present tense form of the modal auxiliary, 
will, would have to be used, and Mary would be referred to by the first person 
pronoun I, as in the quoted sentence in (1c).  
As already said in the introduction, two different ways to capture the 
distinctive interpretive properties of FID have been proposed in the formal 
semantics literature. According to the first line of analysis, sentences are 
(optionally) interpreted with respect to two different contexts: the speaker’s (in 
oral discourse) or narrator’s (in narrative texts) context, and a protagonist’s 
context (see Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008 and Eckardt 2014 for related, but 
technically different implementations of the same basic idea). Let us for the 
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moment follow Eckardt (2014) for concreteness and assume that in the final 
sentence of (1a) a context c, whose parameters are indirectly provided by the 
immediately preceding sentence, is introduced in addition to the narrator’s context 
C: The author of c is the experiencer of the event introduced by the preceding 
sentence, Mary, the time of c is the time immediately following the run time of 
that event, and the location of c is the location of Mary at the time of c. Crucially, 
all lexical items with the exception of pronouns and verbal tenses are lexically 
specified as being interpreted with respect to C by default and with respect to c 
whenever the latter is introduced. Pronouns and verbal tenses, in contrast, always 
have to be interpreted with respect to C. Consequently, the pronoun she and the 
past tense marking on the modal auxiliary are interpreted with respect to the 
narrator’s context C, while the rest of the sentence is interpreted with respect to 
Mary’s context c. Since the sentence does not contain any other context-sensitive 
elements, this is of course only relevant for the interpretation of tomorrow. 
Additionally, the proposition denoted by the sentence is not added to the Common 
Ground of narrator and reader directly. Rather, what is added is the proposition 
that the author of c, Mary, believes that proposition. Simplifying considerably, the 
two sentences in (1a) are accordingly interpreted as paraphrased in (2): 
 
(2) In all worlds of the Common Ground there is an event e of Mary hearing a 
new song by Kendrick Lamar that she likes on the radio on her way home 
and e precedes the time of C, and in all worlds that are compatible with 
what Mary thinks at the time immediately following the run time of e there 
is an event e´ of Mary buying the new album by Kendrick Lamar whose run 
time precedes the time of C and follows the run time of e, and the run time 
of e´ is contained in the day following the day that contains the time of c. 
 
The final sentence in (1b) denotes exactly the same proposition as the one that is 
added to the Common Ground as the denotation of the final sentence in (1a), but 
the crucial difference is that no additional context c is introduced. Rather, all 
deictic elements are interpreted with respect to the narrator’s context C. 
Additionally, the information that the event under consideration is not 
(necessarily) true in the worlds of the Common Ground, but rather in Mary’s 
belief worlds, is directly provided by the propositional attitude verb contained in 
the matrix clause. Finally, in the case of (1c), where the final sentence is quoted, 
all deictic elements are interpreted with respect to the sentence’s original context, 
i.e. the context in which Mary had the quoted thought. Additionally, the thinking 
event itself is introduced by the propositional attitude verb preceding the colon. 
Maier (2015, to appear) proposes a different analysis of FID: He assumes FID 
to be a special form of mixed quotation, i.e. all expressions contained in a 
sentence in FID mode, with the exception of pronouns and verbal tenses, are 
quoted, while pronouns and tenses are unquoted. According to Maier (2015, to 
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appear), the final sentence in (1a) is thus rather similar to the final sentence in 
(1c), with two important differences: First, whereas the thinking event whose 
content is quoted is introduced explicitly in the case of (1c), it has to be 
accommodated in the case of (1a). Second, while in (1c) the thought is quoted in 
its entirety, the pronoun she and the past tense of the modal auxiliary are 
unquoted in (1a). Concerning the question of why pronouns and tenses, as 
opposed to other items, are unquoted in FID, Maier (2015) assumes this to be a 
pragmatically driven convention that is also in effect in other forms of mixed 
quotation (see Maier to appear for discussion). The most important argument that 
Maier gives in favor of his analysis is the following one: FID involves more than 
a shifted interpretation of context-sensitive items. There are also cases such as the 
text segment given in italics in (3) where a protagonist’s thoughts or utterances 
are rendered in the non-standard dialect spoken by that protagonist while the 
surrounding text is written in standard English. Such cases are unproblematic for 
an analysis of FID in terms of mixed quotation. It is unclear, however, how they 
are to be captured by an account which analyzes FID via partial context shift. 
 
(3) He [Big Boy] remembered the day when Buck, jealous of his winning had 
tried to smash his kiln. Yeah, that ol sonofabitch! Naw, Lawd! [. . .] Cussin 
the dead! Yeah, po ol Buck wuz dead now. N Lester too. Yeah it wuz 
awright fer Buck t smash his kiln. Sho. N he wished he hadnt socked ol Buck 
so hard tha day3. 
 
Consider now the three sentences in (4a-c), which differ from those in (1a-c) as 
follows: The content of the first sentence is no longer given as an independent 
sentence, but rather as a when-clause modifying the main clause which 
corresponds to the respective second sentence in (1a-c). 
 
(4) a. * When Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio 
on her way home, she would buy his new album tomorrow. 
b.   When Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio 
on her way home, she thought that she would buy his new album on the 
following day. 
c.   When Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio 
on her way home, she thought: “I will buy his new album tomorrow”. 
 
The main clause in (4a), in contrast to the second sentence in (1a), cannot be 
interpreted as expressing a thought of Mary, with tomorrow being interpreted with 
respect to the fictional context (implicitly) introduced by the when-clause. At the 
same time, no other coherent interpretation is available: On the one hand, the 
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main clause event of Mary buying the new album by Kendrick Lamar is said to 
temporally overlap with the when-clause event, which is located in the past with 
respect to the narrator’s context. On the other hand, the main clause event is 
located in the future with respect to the narrator’s context by tomorrow as well as 
by the modal auxiliary verb. Since no event can meet both temporal 
specifications, the sentence is necessarily contradictory and thus sounds extremely 
awkward. Note that the sentence remains awkward, even if tomorrow is replaced 
by the non-deictic adverbial on the following day, due to those incoherent 
temporal specifications. The variants in (4b) and (4c), in contrast, where a 
thinking event with Mary as experiencer is explicitly introduced, are perfectly 
fine. Note that since in (4b) it is the thinking event which is required to temporally 
overlap with the when-clause event, the double temporal specification of the 
buying event is as unproblematic as in (1a) and (1b): The buying event is said to 
precede the time of the narrator’s context and to follow the run time of the 
thinking event. 
As shown by the analogous contrasts between (5a) and (6a), on the one hand, 
and (5b-c) and (6b-c), on the other, the restriction under consideration does not 
have anything to do with the specific temporal semantics of when: Rather, FID 
only seems to be available at the root level, but not sentence-internally. 
 
(5) a. * After Mary had heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the  
   radio on her way home, she would buy his new album tomorrow. 
b.   After Mary had heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the    
   radio on her way home, she thought that she would buy his new album  
   on the following day. 
c.    After Mary had heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the  
   radio on her way home, she thought: “I will buy his new album    
   tomorrow”. 
(6) a. * Because Mary really liked the song by Kendrick Lamar that she heard 
on the radio on her way home, she would buy his new album 
tomorrow. 
b.   Because Mary really liked the song by Kendrick Lamar that she heard 
on the radio on her way home, she thought that she would buy his new 
album on the following day. 
c.   Because Mary really liked the song by Kendrick Lamar that she heard 
on the radio on her way home, she thought: “I will buy his new album 
tomorrow”. 
 
If one adopts an analysis of FID as involving the introduction of an additional 
protagonist’s context (as in Eckardt 2014; see Schlenker 2004 and Sharvit 2008 
for closely related, but technically different analyses), the contrasts discussed in 
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this section can be taken to show that such an additional context can only be 
introduced at the root level, but not sentence-internally. If one adopts an analysis 
of FID as a special kind of mixed quotation (as in Maier 2015), in contrast, the 
restriction of FID to the root level can be accounted for as follows: The speech or 
thought act to be partially quoted can only be accommodated at the root level, but 
not sentence-internally. In Section 3 I will turn to the question of which of the 
existing analyses of FID is best suited to account for the contrasts observed in this 
section, after having proposed my analysis of a second kind of protagonists’ 
perspective-taking, viewpoint shifting (VS), which will be introduced in the next 
subsection.  
 
2.2 Viewpoint shifting 
 
Consider the text segment in (7), an excerpt from David Eggers’ A Heartbreaking 
Work of Staggering Genius, which is to be understood against the following 
background: After the death of their parents, the ego-narrator, Dave, has to take 
care of his little brother, Toph. Toph has slept at a friend’s house, and Dave has 
spent the night away from home with a woman, but wants Toph to believe that he 
stayed home all night. 
 
(7) I wanted to be home in case he came back early, made it in time … The 
house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he [Toph] 
came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole 
time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of 
Staggering Genius: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). 
 
Obviously, the main clause of the final sentence (in italics) can only be 
understood as describing the situation from Toph’s perspective, as Dave imagines 
it4: First, it would make no sense at all for Dave, the ego-narrator, to refer to 
himself via the definite description his brother instead of the first person pronoun 
I. Second, Dave knows the propositional content of the clause to be false, i.e. he 
knows that he has not been home the whole time, and that he has left. For Toph, 
in contrast, it is plausible to believe it to be true, especially when he sees his 
brother lying in bed and sleeping. 
While the clause in italics is clearly understood as expressing Toph’s 
perspective, there are good reasons to assume that it is not an instance of FID. 
That this is so is, first, confirmed by the acceptability of the variant in (8), where 
the pronoun in the when-clause has been replaced by a definite description that 
clearly indicates that ego-narration is retained in the when-clause, and that the 
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shift to Toph’s perspective occurs in the main clause. Since we have seen 
numerous examples in the previous section that FID is only available at the root 
level, this provides the first crucial piece of evidence that what we see in the main 
clause of the final sentence in (7) is a different kind of perspective taking, which 
I, as already mentioned in the introduction, dub viewpoint shifting (VS).  
 
(8) I wanted to be home in case he came back early, made it in time … The 
house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when my little 
brother came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the 
whole time, of course had never left. 
 
The second piece of evidence is provided by the following observation: Replacing 
the local adverb there in (7) by the adverb here leads to infelicity, as shown in (9). 
If the clause in italics was an instance of FID, however, here would be the 
expected choice: It is one of the defining characteristics of FID that all context-
sensitive expressions with the exception of pronouns and tenses are interpreted 
from the respective protagonist’s perspective, and the adverb refers to the location 
of Toph at the relevant time. This is further confirmed by the fact that in the 
variant in (10), where the content of the clause in italics is given in DD-mode, 
here is perfectly fine.  
 
(9) # …, and when he came back home his brother was here, of course had 
been here the whole time, of course had never left. 
(10)    …, and when he came back home he thought: “My brother is here, of 
course has been here the whole time, of course has never left”. 
 
Consider next the two text segments in (11) and (12), to be understood against the 
following background: Two little dinosaurs, one of them named Billy, have run 
away from some predator that they could not identify and are hiding in a cave. 
 
(11) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in 
the cave on his left. ??[A T-Rex]/[The T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of 
the cave and squinted into the dark. 
(12) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in 
the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds 
later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the 
dark. 
 
In the case of (11), the indefinite a T-Rex can only be understood as introducing a 
novel T-Rex that is distinct from the one referred to by the definite description in 
the first sentence. In fact, the sentence sounds slightly marked in the context of 
the first sentence and requires another instead of a to be fully acceptable (see 
Grønn & Sæbø 2012). In the case of (12), in contrast, the indefinite is not 
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understood as introducing a novel T-Rex, but rather as picking up the T-Rex 
referred to by the definite description in the first sentence. Intuitively, the contrast 
comes about as follows: In (11), using an indefinite to pick up the already familiar 
T-Rex would violate the familiarity condition (Heim 1982) or, alternatively, 
Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991, Singh 2011). After all, the final sentence 
is automatically understood as being told from the narrator’s perspective, just like 
the opening sentence, while the second sentence reports a thought of the T-Rex in 
FID-mode (as indicated by the presence of maybe, which would make little sense 
from the narrator’s perspective). Consequently, the Common Ground of narrator 
and reader is relevant for the interpretation of the indefinite, and with respect to 
that Common Ground the T-Rex chasing the two little dinosaurs is already 
familiar/contextually unique. It can thus only be picked up by a definite 
description or a pronoun, and the indefinite a T-Rex can only be understood as 
introducing a novel T-Rex. In the case of (12), in contrast, the left-adjoined when-
clause licenses a shift from the T-Rex’s to Billy’s perspective. Consequently, the 
main clause describes what Billy sees when he looks up in a way that is 
compatible with Billy’s doxastic state, not with respect to the Common Ground of 
reader and narrator. Since with respect to Billy’s doxastic state the T-Rex chasing 
him is novel, using the definite article is not licensed, and the indefinite can easily 
be understood as picking up the T-Rex that the narrator has referred to via a 
definite description in the opening sentence without violating the familiarity 
condition or Maximize Presupposition! (see Passonneau 1994 and Abbott & Horn 
2011 for discussion of similar uses of indefinites5).  
What is most important for our current purposes is that the shift to Billy’s 
perspective again occurs sentence-internally, not at the root level: It is the when-
clause that makes Billy available as a perspective-taker in virtue of giving a 
neutral description of an event whose experiencer is Billy from the narrator’s 
perspective. This is obvious by comparing (12) with (11), which does not contain 
a left-adjoined when-clause, and where a shift to Billy’s perspective is not 
available. The short text segment in (12) thus involves three different 
perspectives: The first sentence and the when-clause of the third sentence are 
interpreted with respect to the narrator’s perspective, while the second sentence is 
an instance of FID with the T-Rex as perspective-taker. Concerning the 
interpretation of the main clause of the third sentence, the fact that the shift to 
Billy’s perspective occurs sentence-internally provides evidence that it is not an 
instance of FID, but rather of VS. A second reason to assume this is that, 
intuitively, the clause does not report (or partially quote) the content of a 
conscious thought of Billy, as it would if it was FID. Rather, what Billy sees is 
described in a way that is compatible with his doxastic state, i.e. as he presumably 
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would describe it if he were asked to. To see this, consider the variant of (12) 
given in (13), where the content of the main clause of the third sentence is given 
in DD-mode, i.e. as a full quote of a conscious thought of Billy that is explicitly 
introduced as such. The text segment in (13) is not equivalent to (12), in contrast 
to cases like (1a) and (1c) from above. Rather, the final sentence in (13) sounds 
rather unnatural, or at least far less natural than the one in (12).  
 
(13) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in 
the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds 
later, he thought: “A T-Rex is bending down to the entrance of the cave and 
squinting into the dark”. 
 
As a final instance of VS consider the main clause of the sentence in (14): It has a 
prominent reading on which the ground did not really shake, but Mary just had 
that feeling as a result of her sense of balance being disturbed by the boat trip. As 
in the previous examples, the shift from the narrator’s to the protagonist’s 
perspective occurs sentence-internally, i.e. the when-clause gives a neutral 
description of an event whose agent is Mary from the narrator’s perspective and 
thereby establishes Mary as a (potential) perspective-taker with regard to the 
content of the main clause. Again, the main clause is not (or at least not 
necessarily) understood as reporting a conscious thought of Mary, but rather as 
describing a sensation of her in a way that is compatible with her doxastic state at 
the time at which she has that sensation. 
 
(14) When Mary stepped out of the boat, the ground was shaking beneath her 
feet for a couple of seconds. 
 
In this section I have provided evidence for the existence of VS as a kind of 
protagonist’s perspective taking that is clearly different from FID in at least three 
respects: First, it is not only available at the root level, but sentence-internally. 
Second, it does not (necessarily) report a protagonist’s conscious thoughts, but 
rather describes an eventuality perceived by a protagonist or a sensation of a 
protagonist in a way that is compatible with that protagonist’s doxastic state at the 
time at which she perceives the respective eventuality/has the respective 
sensation. Third, it does not involve a shifted interpretation of context-sensitive 
items. In Section 3 I will first propose a formal analysis of VS and then return to 
the question of which of the existing formal analyses of FID is best suited to 
account for the restriction of FID to the root level in a natural way. 
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3 Analysis 
 
3.1 Viewpoint shifting 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that VS, in contrast to FID, is not restricted 
to the root level, but can occur sentence-internally. I assume that this is because 
VS does not involve the accommodation of a speech or thought act. Rather, an 
eventuality (where the term eventuality applies to dynamic events as well as to 
states, as in Landman 2000) is described in a way that is compatible with the 
doxastic state of a prominent protagonist at the time of him or her perceiving it. 
Consequently, a perceiving eventuality needs to be accommodated on the basis of 
contextually prominent information. In the cases considered in this paper that 
information is provided by the left-adjoined when-clause whose run time 
determines the run time of the perceiving event and whose agent or experiencer 
provides the experiencer argument of the perceiving eventuality.  
I assume that just like everything that all interlocuters perceive consciously 
during a conversation becomes part of their Common Ground (Stalnaker 1978, 
2002), everything a protagonist in a narrative text perceives consciously becomes 
part of the set of propositions representing his/her beliefs at the relevant time. 
Crucially, under certain conditions (namely in those where VS applies), the 
content of a clause is not added to the Common Ground of reader and narrator 
directly, but rather to the set of propositions that represent the doxastic state of a 
prominent protagonist. For concreteness, I assume the following technical 
implementation of VS: A covert operator  OPVS is optionally inserted at the TP-
node of finite matrix clauses. That operator takes an eventuality predicate P as its 
argument and returns a predicate of perceiving eventualities whose further 
properties are determined by the context and whose experiencer is some 
contextually prominent individual x. Crucially, in all worlds representing the 
doxastic state of x at the time immediately following (the run time of) the 
respective perceiving eventuality, there is an eventuality satisfying the original 
eventuality predicate P. The covert VS-operator is defined in (15). Note that it 
takes a covert pronoun introducing a free variable that ranges over individuals 
(given as 1) and a covert pronoun introducing a free variable that ranges over 
eventuality predicates (given as C2) as arguments. 
 
(15) [[OPVS 1 C2]]g,C	=	λP<ev,<s,t>> .  λe . λw . PERC(e)(w) ∧ g(C2)(e)(w) 
∧ Experiencer(e, g(1))(w) ∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(g(1))(τ(e)+)(w) [∃e´ [P(e´)(w) ∧ 
overlap(τ(e), τ(e´)]], 
where g is the assignment function, ev is the type of eventualities, s is the 
type of possible worlds, PERC(e)(w) means that e is a perceiving 
eventuality in world w, τ(e) is the run time of e, τ(e)+ is the time 
immediately following the run time of e and DOX(g(1))(τ(e)+)(w) is the set of 
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possible worlds that are compatible with what the individual assigned by g 
to the index 1 believes at τ(e)+ in w. 
 
Now, various conditions have to be met in order for the insertion of OPVS to be 
felicitous. First, there has to be a contextually prominent individual that can be 
assigned to the free individual variable. Second, since a value for C2 needs to be 
determined, the context has to make available further information concerning the 
respective perceiving eventuality. Third, since I assume the insertion of a covert 
operator to be costly, there has to be a reason for inserting OPVS. In the cases 
considered in this paper, the reason is that the respective clauses would otherwise 
receive an inadequate interpretation. Finally, I assume that (again for economy 
reasons) there has to be a connection between the perceiving eventualities e and 
the doxastic states of their respective experiencers x at the time t immediately 
following the run time of e in the following sense: The doxastic state of x at t may 
not be identical to the doxastic state of x at the time preceding t.  
With these assumptions in place, let us now have detailed look at how the 
examples discussed in Section 2.2 are interpreted. I will start with the example in 
(7), repeated here as (16): 
 
(16) I wanted to be home in case he came back early, made it in time … The 
house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he [Toph] 
came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole 
time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of 
Staggering Genius: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62).  
 
In the case of the clause in italics in (7)/(16), all conditions for the insertion of 
OPVS are met. First, the free individual variable can be resolved to the ego-
narrator’s brother, Toph: Being the agent of the locally highly prominent event 
introduced by the when-clause makes him a very suitable candidate. Second, the 
required information concerning the further specification of the perceiving 
eventuality is indirectly made available by the events introduced by the preceding 
sentences in combination with the one introduced by the when-clause: C2 can thus 
presumably be resolved to the property of being an eventuality of seeing whose 
experiencer is Toph and whose theme is an event of Toph’s brother lying in bed 
and sleeping. Third, without the insertion of OPVS the clause would receive an 
inadequate interpretation since (a) it would be extremely awkward for the ego 
narrator to refer to himself via the definite description his brother instead of the 
first person pronoun I and (b) the ego narrator knows the proposition denoted by 
that clause to be false. Finally, there is a plausible connection between the 
eventualities e of Toph seeing his brother lying in bed and sleeping and Toph’s 
doxastic state immediately after the run time of e: I assume that prior to e, Toph 
already assumed that his brother would be home and would have been home all 
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night, as indicated by the two occurrences of of course. Nevertheless, he could not 
be entirely sure, i.e. it was not true in all of his belief worlds, but only in all of his 
belief worlds that are compatible with his assumptions concerning the 
stereotypical course of events. After seeing his brother lying in bed and sleeping, 
it is true in all of his belief worlds that his brother is home and has been home all 
night. 
In (17) the (slightly simplified, since I have set aside the meaning of of course 
and abbreviated the value of C2 as see) denotation of the clause in italics is 
derived step by step, under the assumption that OPVS is inserted directly at the TP-
node (together with the covert individual and eventuality predicate pronouns) and 
takes the eventuality predicate denoted by the TP as its argument. Note that TC is 
the contextually determined time interval providing the instants quantified over by 
the whole time and never – namely the previous night. 
 
(17) λP<ev,<s,t>> . λe . λw . PERC(e)(w) ∧ g(C2)(e)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e, g(1))(w) 
∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(g(1))(τ(e)+)(w) [∃e´ [P(e´)(w) ∧ overlap(τ(e), τ(e´)]] 
(λe . λw . home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) ∧ τ(e) < t0 
∧ ∀t ∈ TC [∃e´[home(e´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) ∧ τ(e´) ⊆  t ∧ τ(e´) < 
τ(e)]] ∧ ¬∃t ∈ TC [∃e´´[leave(e´´) ∧ Agent(e´´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) 
∧ τ(e´´) ⊆ t ∧ τ(e´´) < τ(e)]])	= 
λe. λw . PERC(e)(w) ∧ see(e)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e, toph)(w) 
∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(toph))(τ(e)+)(w) [∃e´ [home(e´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w´))(w´) ∧ 
τ(e´) < t0  ∧ ∀t ∈ TC [∃e´´[home(e´´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w)´)(w) ∧ τ(e´´) ⊆  
t ∧ τ(e´´) < τ(e´)]] ∧ ¬∃t ∈ TC [∃e´´´[leave(e´´´) ∧ Agent(e´´´, ιx. brother(x, 
toph)(w´))(w´) ∧ τ(e´´´) ⊆  t ∧ τ(e´´´) < τ(e´)]] ∧ overlap(τ(e), τ(e´)]]. 
 
Combining the eventuality predicate derived in (17) with the one denoted by the 
when-clause gives us the proposition in (18) as the denotation of the final 
sentence in (7)/(16). 
 
(18) λw . ∃e∃e´[come_home(e)(w) ∧ Agent(e, toph)(w) ∧ τ(e) < t0 
∧ PERC(e´)(w) ∧ see(e´)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e´, toph)(w) 
∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(toph))(τ(e´)+)(w) [∃e´´ [home(e´´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w´))(w´) 
∧ τ(e´´) < t0 ∧ ∀t ∈ TC [∃e´´´[home(e´´´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w´)(w´) ∧ 
τ(e´´´) ⊆ t ∧ τ(e´´´) < τ(e´´)]] ∧ ¬∃t ∈ TC [∃e´´´´[leave(e´´´´) 
∧ Agent(e´´´´, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w´))(w´) ∧ τ(e´´´´) ⊆  t ∧ τ(e´´´´) < 
τ(e´´)]] ∧ overlap(τ(e´), τ(e´´)]] ∧ overlap(τ(e), τ(e´)] 
 
Note that since the entire novel containing the text segment in (7)/(16) is told 
from the perspective of the ego-narrator, Dave, the proposition in (18) is 
intersected with the set of worlds compatible with Dave’s beliefs. 
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Let us consider the text segment in (12) next, repeated here as (19): 
 
(19) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in 
the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds 
later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the 
dark. 
 
Concerning the main clause of the third sentence in (12)/(19), the conditions for 
the insertion of the covert VS-operator are likewise fulfilled. First, the free 
individual variable can be resolved to Billy since being the agent of the event 
introduced by the when-clause makes him locally highly prominent. Second, the 
required information concerning the further specification of the perceiving 
eventuality can be inferred on the basis of the information provided by the when-
clause in combination with the content of the clause itself, since it is obviously an 
event of Billy seeing the event introduced by main clause. Third, there is an 
obvious connection between the perceiving eventuality and Billy’s doxastic state 
at the time immediately following the run time of that eventuality, since prior to 
the perceiving eventuality he does not believe there to be a T-Rex that is bending 
down to the entrance of the cave and squinting into the dark. Finally, the main 
clause would receive an inadequate interpretation without the insertion of the 
covert VS-operator for the following reason: On the one hand, interpreting the 
indefinite as picking up the T-Rex referred to by a definite description in the 
opening sentence would violate the familiarity condition (Heim 1982) and/or 
Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991, Singh 2011). On the other hand, 
interpreting it as introducing a second, novel T-Rex would, first, make the text 
segment rather incoherent. Second, as shown by Grønn & Sæbø (2012), replacing 
a by another is almost obligatory or at least strongly preferred in such cases. 
In (20) the (again slightly simplified) denotation of the main clause in the 
third sentence in (19) is given:  
 
(20) λe. λw . PERC(e)(w) ∧ see(e)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e, billy)(w) 
∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(billy)(τ(e)+)(w) [∃e´∃x[T-Rex(x)(w´) ∧ bend_down(e´)(w´) 
∧ Agent(e´, x)(w´) ∧ τ(e´) < t0 ∧ overlap(τ(e), τ(e´))]]     
 
Combining the eventuality predicate in (20) with the one denoted by the when-
clause and applying existential closure gives us the proposition in (21) as the 
denotation of the final sentence in (12)/(19). 
 
(21) λw . ∃e∃e´[look_up(e)(w) ∧ Agent(e, billy)(w) ∧ τ(e) < t0  ∧ PERC(e´)(w)∧ 
see(e´)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e´, billy)(w) ∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(billy)(τ(e´)+)(w) [∃e´´∃x[T-
Rex(x)(w´) ∧ bend_down(e´´)(w´) ∧ Agent(e´´, x)(w´) ∧ τ(e´´) < t0 ∧ 
overlap(τ(e´), τ(e´´))]] ∧ overlap(τ(e), τ(e´))] 
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In the case of the text segment in (12)/(19), there is no ego-narrator. Rather, the 
story is told by a neutral, omniscient narrator. Consequently, I assume that the 
proposition in (21) is intersected with the set of worlds representing the Common 
Ground of narrator and reader. 
Finally, consider the sentence in (14), repeated here as (22). Here, the 
conditions for the insertion of the covert VS-operator at the TP-node of the main 
clause are met again: First, being the agent of the event introduced by the when-
clause, Mary is prominent enough for the free individual variable to be resolved to 
her. Second, a suitable value for the free variable ranging over eventuality 
predicates can be inferred on the basis of the content of the when-clause in 
combination with the one of the main clause itself. Third, the sentence (at least in 
the absence of an earthquake scenario) would receive an inadequate interpretation 
without the insertion of the VS-operator. Finally, there is an obvious connection 
between the perceiving eventuality e and Mary’s doxastic state at the time 
immediately following the run time of e: Without having the internal sensation 
caused by a disturbance of her sense of balance resulting from the boat trip, Mary 
would not believe that the ground was shaking beneath her feet (a belief that will 
most likely not last longer than a few seconds). The sentence is thus interpreted as 
shown in (23). 
 
(22) When Mary stepped out of the boat, the ground was shaking beneath her 
feet for a couple of seconds. 
(23) λw . ∃e∃e´[step_out_of_boat(e)(w) ∧ Agent(e, mary)(w) ∧ τ(e) < t0                           
∧ PERC(e´)(w) ∧ internal_sensation(e´)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e´, mary)(w)                      
∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(mary)(τ(e´)+)(w) [∃e´´[shake(e´´)(w´) ∧ Theme(e´´, ground)(w´)                     
∧ τ(e´´) < t0  ∧ overlap(τ(e´), τ(e´´))]] ∧ overlap(τ(e), τ(e´))] 
 
In this section I have proposed a formal analysis of VS according to which it 
comes about via the insertion of a covert operator at the TP-node of the respective 
main clause. The proposed analysis is flexible enough to capture the two 
following kinds of cases: First, cases such as (7)/(16) and (14)/(22), in which the 
proposition p that is true in the respective protagonist’s doxastic state is false with 
respect to the Common Ground of narrator and reader. Second, cases such as 
(12)/(19), in which p is true in the Common Ground of speaker and narrator as 
well, but would have to be replaced by a presuppositionally stronger one if it was 
added to that Common Ground directly. At the same time, the application of VS is 
not unconstrained: There has to be a reason for the insertion of the covert VS-
operator, and the context has to make available suitable values for the free 
variables ranging over individuals and eventuality predicates, respectively. In the 
following Section, I will return to the question of which of the analyses of FID 
sketched in Section 2.1 is best suited to account for its being restricted to the root 
level. 
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3.2 Free Indirect Discourse 
 
In Section 2.1 we have seen that FID in contrast to DD and ID as well as VS is 
only available at the root level, but not sentence-internally, as shown by contrasts 
like the one between (1a) and (4b-c) (repeated here as (24a) and (24c-d), 
respectively), on the one hand, and (4a) (repeated here as (24b)), on the other. 
 
(24) a.   On her way home, Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked 
on the radio. She would buy his new album tomorrow. 
b. * When Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio 
on her way home, she would buy his new album tomorrow. 
c.   When Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio 
on her way home, she thought that she would buy his new album on the 
following day. 
d.   When Mary heard a song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio 
on her way home, she thought: “I will buy his new album tomorrow”. 
 
As already mentioned in Section 2.1, there are two different lines of analysis of 
FID: According to the first line, FID results from the presence of a second context 
in addition to the narrator’s context, with all context-sensitive expressions except 
pronouns and tenses being interpreted with respect to that second context 
(Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014, building on Banfiled 1982 and 
Doron 1991). According to the second line, FID is a special form of mixed 
quotation, with pronouns and tenses being unquoted (Maier 2015, to appear). 
Let us first have a look at how the restriction of FID to the root level can be 
implemented in analyses of the first kind. Sharvit (2008) assumes that in FID a 
covert operator is inserted that is similar to a propositional attitude verb such as 
think or say, but does not quantify over worlds that are compatible with the 
respective attitude holder’s beliefs, but rather over contexts c such that the 
respective protagonist does not rule out the possibility that she is in c. 
Consequently, FID is in effect analyzed just like ID, the only difference being that 
all context-sensitive expressions with the exception of pronouns and tenses 
receive a shifted interpretation. Contrasts like the one between (24a) and (24b) are 
thus unexpected, i.e. one would not expect the covert FID-operator to behave 
differently from propositional attitude verbs such as say or think with respect to 
the syntactic environments in which it can be inserted. Therefore, the restriction 
of FID to the root level would simply have to be stipulated in the form of a 
restriction on the insertion options of the covert FID-operator. 
Schlenker (2004) assumes all sentences to be interpreted with respect to two 
contexts – the Context of Utterance (ν) and the Context of Thought (θ), where the 
former is the context where the respective sentence is uttered and the latter the 
context where the corresponding speech or thought act originates. Usually, the 
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two contexts are identical, but in principle they can diverge, with FID being a case 
in point. In FID, ν is the context of the omniscient narrator, and θ the context 
where the respective protagonist speaks or thinks. Since all context-sensitive 
expressions with the exception of pronouns and tenses (which are always 
interpreted with respect to ν) are lexically specified as being interpreted with 
respect to θ, they all receive a shifted interpretation in FID. 
While the restriction of FID to the root level does not automatically follow 
from the analysis just sketched, it can be derived as follows: Since (with some 
well-known exceptions) only entire sentences correspond to speech acts, a speech 
or thought act distinct from the one performed by the narrator in telling the entire 
story can only be accommodated at the root level. Consequently, it is only with 
respect to entire sentences that ν and θ can come apart, not at the level of matrix 
clauses contained in complex sentences. 
Eckardt (2014) assumes that a protagonist’s context c can optionally be added 
to the speaker’s or narrator’s context C, with all context-sensitive expressions 
except pronouns and tenses being interpreted with respect to c whenever it is 
present. The restriction of FID to the root level could be derived from Eckardt’s 
(2014) analysis along lines similar to those sketched for Schlenker’s (2004) 
account: In order for the addition of c to be feasible, a speech or thought act of 
some contextually prominent protagonist has to be accommodated by the reader, 
and since (generally) only entire sentences correspond to speech or thought acts, 
the accommodation of speech or thought acts is restricted to the root level. 
Let us finally turn to Maier’s (2015, to appear) analysis of FID as a special 
form of mixed quotation, according to which FID involves the accommodation of 
a speech or thought act that is partially quoted by the narrator, with pronouns and 
tenses being unquoted. On this account, the restriction of FID to the root level 
could also be derived from the fact that (generally) only entire sentences 
correspond to speech or thought acts. 
Given the discussion so far, there does not seem to be much to choose 
between the analyses of Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt (2014), on the one hand, 
and the one of Maier (2015, to appear), on the other, as far as their ability to 
account for the restriction of FID to the root level is concerned. In each case, the 
restriction can be derived from the combination of the two following factors: 
First, the reader needs to accommodate a protagonist’s speech or thought act. 
Second, speech or thought acts (generally) correspond to entire sentences, not to 
finite matrix clauses that are part of complex sentences. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference: In Schlenker’s (2004) and Eckardt’s (2014) analyses, the connection 
between the speech or thought act to be accommodated and the additional 
protagonist’s context remains rather indirect and obscure, i.e. it is not really part 
of the analysis. Rather, what is spelled out in formally precise terms is only the 
interpretive effect of the addition of a second context to the narrator’s context. On 
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Maier’s (2015, to appear) account, in contrast, the accommodated speech or 
thought act is an integral part of the analysis, since in its absence there simply is 
nothing to be quoted. For this reason and because an analysis in terms of mixed 
quotation captures the speech-like character of FID as opposed to VS most 
clearly, I tentatively adopt Maier’s (2015, to appear) analysis of FID for the 
purposes of this paper and propose that its restriction to the root level results from 
the need to accommodate a speech or thought act to be partially quoted. 
 
4 Directions for future research 
 
As already observed by Montague (1969), perception verbs such as see and hear 
in addition to their standard veridical uses have non-veridical uses as well: A 
sentence such as (25), for example, has a reading on which it does not entail the 
existence of unicorns, i.e. it can be true in a situation in which Angela in fact saw 
a white horse that she mistook for a unicorn. 
 
(25) Angela saw a unicorn.  
 
The analysis argued for in this paper now opens up the possibility that such 
readings do not come about because of lexical ambiguity or because of the 
presence of an elided occurrence of seems (Montague 1969), but rather because of 
an insertion of the covert VS-operator6. Adopting this view, the sentence in (25) 
would be interpreted as shown in (26), with the free individual variable being 
resolved to Angela and the free variable ranging over eventualities being resolved 
to the predicate λe. see(e). On this reading, the sentence can be paraphrased as 
follows: Mary saw something and directly afterwards she believed that she saw a 
unicorn, which seems to be adequate. 
 
(26) λw . ∃e[PERC(e)(w) ∧ see(e)(w) ∧ Experiencer(e, angela)(w)                                           
∧ ∀w´ ∈ DOX(angela)(τ(e)+)(w) [∃e´∃x[unicorn(x)(w´) ∧ see(e´)(w´)                                      
∧ Experiencer(e´, angela)(w´) ∧ Theme(e´, x)(w´) ∧ τ(e´) < t0  ∧ 
overlap(τ(e), τ(e´))]]]                           
 
Such an analysis is highly attractive insofar as it reduces what at first sight 
appears to be a special property of a restricted class of verbs to a more general 
phenomenon. It remains to be seen, however, whether the conditions under which 
non-veridical uses of perception verbs are available are identical to those under 
which VS is available in narrative texts. Since a detailed discussion of this matter 
is beyond the scope of the present paper, I leave it as a topic for future research. 
                                                
6 I am grateful to Ede Zimmermann for pointing out to me this potential connection between my 
research on VS and non-veridical uses of perception verbs. 
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